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 The article addresses the specific characteristics of political 
corruption in Croatia, from the time on when the country gained its 
independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation 
and the “Yugoslav self-managing socialist model”. Political corrup-
tion in Croatia shares common traits with the phenomenon as it ap-
pears in other transitional countries, but it also shows unique charac-
teristics that derive from a privatization model that was implemented 
during unsettled political and social conditions, i.e., the war in former 
Yugoslavia and the appearance of a new political class legitimized by 
the war and the struggle for independence. The authoritarian political 
regime established during and immediately after the war relied, 
mostly, on the new political elite that gained enormous wealth owing 
to a privatization process that favored the political nomenclature and 
nationalist elite and distributed the formerly socially owned capital 
into targeted private hands. In the years following the demise of the 
Croatian Democratic Union, the nationalist party led by President 
Tuđman, political corruption has not been eradicated and it still re-
mains a serious problem that affects the performance of Croatian de-
mocracy and its readiness for EU accession. The author tries to iden-
tify the causes, the forms and the consequences of political corruption 
in Croatia, as well as the instruments of combating this phenomenon. 
He also aims to specify ways to accommodate to EU conditionality, 
and methods of raising awareness to the dangers of political corrup-
tion in the political discourse of the country. 
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1. Political corruption and political science: the quest for  
   definition 
 Political corruption is, without doubt, a global phenomenon that fully 
emerged in the Post-Cold War period. It has drawn increasing attention from 
policy-makers as well as from scholars. Corruption is, however, a well 
known phenomenon to political theorists and thinkers. The problem of cor-
ruption in politics has been a recurrent topic in political philosophy since 
Plato and Aristotle, but was better known and explored by modern political 
theorists such as Machiavelli and Montesquieu. Modern political science, 
discovered the problem relatively late. Political corruption expanded after 
the Cold War in the political milieu of economic, social and political trans-
formation and transition of Communist states into democratic polities. Yet 
the first warnings of political corruption as a global phenomenon emerged in 
post-colonial societies during the late sixties and the seventies, when it ap-
peared that the political system in countries liberated from colonial oppres-
sion quickly degenerated into corrupt government and corrupted political 
processes. One of the first analyses in the field was done by Joseph Nye, 
who linked corruption and political development, exploring the cost-benefit 
outcomes of this interaction. James S. Scott, Arnold Heidenhammer, Gunnar 
Myrdal, Samuel Huntington and others introduced political corruption in 
comparative politics at the end of the sixth decade of the last century. Since 
then, comparative political corruption studies have flourished, alongside 
with the flourishing of political corruption itself (Scott, 1972; Heidenham-
mer, 1970). 
 Since the sixties political corruption has been treated in all its aspects: as 
the legitimate concern of political theory, and an issue pertaining to com-
parative politics. Works on political corruption have proliferated, just like 
courses on political corruption offered by prestigious political science 
schools. It is enough to explore the syllabuses of these courses offered 
around the world, from the Columbia University to Oslo University, from 
Tokyo University to the University of Mexico City. One of the latest initia-
tives, the Central European University annual conference offering “educa-
tion for the educators”, i.e. propagating the teaching and introducing of for-
mal university courses on political corruption in the political science curric-
ula – both as a theoretical issue and as an issue of comparative politics – has 
already given a result and newly opened courses in political corruption are 
now offered throughout Eastern Europe, in former Communist countries 
(Croatia excluded, so far). 
 Yet the quest for a definition is still ongoing: as Max Weber argued, one 
should not begin with a definition, but should derive it by looking at specific 
examples. This, however, would never yield a final definition, but one tai-
lored to the purposes at hand. Therefore, a definition must be gradually put 
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together from the individual parts, which are taken from historical reality. 
Thus, the final and definitive concept cannot stand at the beginning of the 
investigation, but must come at the end. We must – argues Weber – work out 
the best conceptual formulation in the course of the discussion, as its most 
important result. Thus, if we try to determine the object of analysis and his-
torical explanation, it cannot be in the form of a conceptual definition, but, at 
least in the beginning only a provisional definition, argues Weber. 
 Yet it is necessary to begin with dissipating the dilemmas and ambigui-
ties that surround the concept of political corruption. There are many mis-
conceptions that obfuscate the theoretical discourse and the political research 
in the field. Political corruption is often misunderstood and simplified to 
bribery, embezzlement, graft, as in the classical concept of the Chinese 
Yang-lien, the principle of “nourishing incorruptness” (as it is described in 
the Book of the Rulers of the Shan District) or in the old Indian political 
textbook Artashastra, where Kautylia (known also as Chanakya) identified 
none less then forty ways of embezzling money from the government 2300 
years ago. The modern parallels of these simplifications can be recognized in 
the reduction of combatting political corruption to fighting against bribery, 
and corruption is frequently equated with the corruptness of political offi-
cials, linking politicians with organized crime, money laundering, drug traf-
ficking, etc. Thus we have to differentiate corruption in general from politi-
cal corruption, albeit the two processes are intertwined. While corruption in 
business can be easily reduced to bribery and improper proprietary advan-
tages, political corruption is more elusive and implies the general decay of 
politics, namely, that of political institutions, processes, values and the be-
havior of political actors. While corruption means deviation from the formal 
duties of a public role for private, pecuniary gains, political corruption is the 
pathology of politics: its main object is not necessarily pecuniary advantage, 
but bypassing the whole political system that would serve anything else than 
pecuniary advantages. It includes peddling of influence, misuse of public of-
fice, gains in status, non-material advantages, manipulation of public power 
and authority, abuse of power. Eventually it undermines the confidence of 
citizens in democracy, erodes the rule of law and leads to a denial of human 
rights, while hindering the social and economic development of the country. 
It is the cancer of most political system, but first and foremost of democracy. 
 Two basic approaches can be used to study political corruption: that of 
the legal theoreticians and practitioners, who tend to reduce corruption to 
unlawful behavior that culminates in a criminal act; or the approach of po-
litical theorists and political scientists, who tend to treat political corruption 
as the invisible distortion of public power and the abuse of political power in 
order to achieve not necessarily private interests, but political interests that 
distort the wholesomeness of the Common Good. While the outcome of cor-
ruption in business and, more generally, corruption is the triumph of the pri-
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vate over the public, the outcome of political corruption is not the triumph of 
the private but of the particular interest over the public interest, where this 
particular interest can be identified with the interest of a political group, 
class, party, caste, interest group, political elite, ethnic group, etc. The indi-
vidual is the agent and beneficiary of corruption in general (it may be also 
his close family, private clique, etc.), while the agent of political corruption 
is a political actor (instead of close family we find here political clients and 
cronies). For instance, business and small-scale corruption may exist and 
persist in a politically relatively corruption-free society, as an exception, de-
pending of the tradition of the society. But when business corruption invades 
politics, it may infect the whole political system and bring it to a faster de-
generation. Obviously, we have to make the precise distinction among vari-
ous kinds of corruption: such as business, administrative and political cor-
ruption. In the early stages of corruption research a somewhat naïve ap-
proach tended to link corruption to modernization. Huntington in his Mod-
ernization and Corruption (1968) even asserted that corruption in business 
plays a stimulating role in fighting bureaucratic stagnation and immobility. 
Nathaniel Left tried to push economic development through bureaucratic 
corruption, while Veloso Abueva dealt with the contribution of nepotism, 
spoils, and graft to political development. Four basic approaches crystallized 
in the debate in the sixties and the seventies: that of the moralists, such as 
Myrdal and Andreski; that of the “integrationists”, such as Merton, Bayley, 
Left, Leys, etc.; that of the “economists”, such as Nye and Pinto-Duchinsky, 
and that of the “institutionalists” such as Huntington, Heidenheimer and 
Scott. However, I shall not dwell on the history of the corruption debate 
here, instead I would like to focus on political corruption. This is the kind of 
corruption that does not involve money changing hands: it takes the form of 
trading in influence or granting favors that poison politics and threaten de-
mocracy. We need to speak about that form of corruption that erode the 
state, threaten the very viability of democracy and makes democracy vulner-
able and compromised to the extent of destroying it.  
 In 1994 the OECD defined corruption as the activity that involves the 
performance of non-pertinent advantages, pecuniary or of other nature, to a 
foreign public official, thus violating his official duties, with the aim to ob-
tain or continue to maintain an affair. This is quite clear, having in mind that 
this is exactly the purpose of the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction, signed by 
OECD countries in November 1997. The same year the Council of Europe 
adopted a working definition more appropriate to the notion of political cor-
ruption: political corruption is a serious threat to the basic principles of the 
Council of Europe, undermines the public in the functioning of democratic 
institutions and processes, erodes the rule of law and, via facti, constitutes a 
sheer denial of human rights. There are two other officially approved defini-
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tions that may help us: one is the European Union’s Convention on the Fight 
Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Of-
ficials of Member-States of the European Union, from 1997, that reads as 
follows: “corruption relates to any abuse of power or impropriety in the de-
cision-making process brought about by some undue inducement or benefit” 
(Grubiša, 2004). The other is Transparency International’s working defini-
tion. The latter seems the most comprehensive and suitable for the purposes 
of this article: political corruption is, defined simply, the abuse of political 
power for private or political party gain by public officials, politicians, and 
civil servants. Political corruption, thus, involves behavior on the part of of-
ficials in the public sector, through which they improperly and unlawfully 
enrich themselves or those close to them, by the use of public power en-
trusted to them. We might object to the nature of this enrichment: it is not to 
be understood always in terms of material goods, but in values in general, 
more akin to Lasswell’s definition of politics, where politics is precisely who 
gets what, when and how. According to Lasswell and his definition of poli-
tics, political corruption cannot be perceived even as the pathology of poli-
tics and of the political process, but rather normal politics taken to excess.  
 Political corruption, therefore, could be better understood not as a crimi-
nal offense or a discrete, fluid phenomenon, but the extension of normal po-
litical behavior. Essentially, one type of corruption is a question of quantity 
where political behavior is taken to excess; the other type is characterized by 
quality, where it involves activities deemed unacceptable in the eye of the 
law, or according to significant opinion formers (Harris, 2003). In this sense, 
political corruption is the natural extension of politics, as war is the con-
tinuation of politics by using other means, as Clausewitz put it. However, 
one must ad that political corruption is not the continuation of politics by 
other means, but on the contrary: by the same means. This helps us under-
stand Aristotle’s taxonomy of the forms of government: each legitimate form 
of government has its corrupt variant, where an excess or abuse of power oc-
curs. Monarchy’s corrupt form is tyranny, aristocracy’s is oligarchy, and 
democracy’s is anarchy, which ends in ochlocracy or kakistocracy – the rule 
of the bad, and even the rule of the worst. For Machiavelli, the thin line that 
separates the “correct” forms from the “corrupt” forms is only the excess of 
power, the exaggeration in the quantity of power used, the thin line that 
separates the use of power from the abuse of power. And, if politics is really 
who gets what, when and how, then politics itself is equated with corruption, 
depending on the quantity of power, or as noted in Plato’s Dialogue, on the 
amount of the gifts the Statesman gets and gives. 
 Definitions of corruption are not static. Society’s understanding of what 
counts as corrupt evolves constantly, as Klitgaard (1988) states. Over time 
societies have been able to make a distinction between bribe and allowable 
reciprocity or transaction. In all societies we are likely to find at least four 
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definitions of corruption: that of the moralists, that of the written law, that of 
the law enforced, and that of common practice. I should add a fifth: that of 
the political scientist, who does not perceive political corruption as a devia-
tion in political behavior but more as an inherent ingredient of the political 
process, and for that reason even more dangerous and insidious. As Machia-
velli put it, in politics we have to go beyond the surface, and explore the ef-
fectual truth of things. 
 
2. Political corruption in transitional societies 
 The appearance and spread of political corruption in the transitional 
countries of Eastern Europe triggered a massive response from political sci-
entists and from policymakers: the most proficient years where the late 90’s. 
Not only did major works appear analyzing the substance and extent of po-
litical corruption (Rose-Ackerman, Heywood, Della Porta, Meny et al.), but 
also all the major documents for the fight against political corruption were 
written during those years. The World Bank launched its warning at the be-
ginning of the decade; the UN launched its campaign under the title “Action 
against corruption” in 1991 and again in 1997; The Council of Europe pro-
duced a set of initiatives, including Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on 
Corruption, alongside with the Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials 
and the famous Twenty Recommendations Against Corruption, in the time 
span from 1995 to 1999. The European Parliament adopted a Report on Civil 
Liberties and Internal Affairs on Combatting Corruption in Europe in 1995; 
the OECD formulated its Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Public Transactions in 1997; the European 
Union circulated among member-states its Convention on the Fight Against 
Corruption involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of 
Member States of the European Union in 1997, and the same year the EU 
adopted its Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on a Union Policy against Corruption (for a complete 
list of international documents and instruments concerning political corrup-
tion and corruption in general cf. Grubiša, 2004). The proliferation of such 
documents is clearly coincidental: the main reasons are is the outcome of the 
reforms adopted in transitional, former Communist countries, and the condi-
tionality request set forth by the European Union as part of the Copenhagen 
and Madrid criteria for the accession of candidate countries to EU member-
ship (Trang, 1994; Monitoring the EU Accession Process, 2002).  
 Political corruption captured the attention of the emerging civil society, 
both in transitional countries and in old democracies. The explosion of po-
litical corruption in the East suddenly activated the political sensors of po-
litical scientists and policy makers in the West as well. Suddenly, political 
corruption was discovered as a rampant phenomenon in everyday politics 
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and politicking within old democracies. In 1992, the government of Italy, 
one of the founding states of the European Union, collapsed in a maxi-scan-
dal, when the, so called, “Clean-Hand” corruption bomb disclosed the ubiq-
uity of corruption within the political system. The British Parliament, one of 
the oldest in the World, had to adopt principles applying to “all aspect of 
public life”, known as the famous Nolan’s Commission Relevant Principles 
Concerning the Integrity of Public Life, in 1995. Santer’s European Com-
mission had to resign due to political corruption scandal(s) in 1999.  
 It seemed that after the disappearance of democracy’s major enemy, 
communism, democracy itself started to erode quickly. It may be under-
standable  why political corruption was not exposed before, in the years pre-
ceding the collapse of communism: as Churchill said, democracy is the 
worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.  When it 
can be compared, of course. But when the measure of comparison disap-
pears, than all its contradictions resurface. While communism was THE En-
emy, the dark side of democracy was not as visible as it became when com-
munism fell. Political corruption in Western democracies was almost insig-
nificant in comparison to the quantity of political corruption in the Third 
World or in communist totalitarian societies. By extending Lord Acton’s 
famous maxim, that if power corrupts, then absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely, to this problem, one can say that the most corrupt societies are, by 
definition, totalitarian societies. 
 Political science itself and the emergent civil society, which developed a 
network of issue-oriented non-governmental organizations combating politi-
cal corruption and corruption in general, were the ones who profited from 
this course of events, whereas this “profit” is to be considered as a sad 
achievement. As corruption became rampant, political science developed 
new theories – the theory of corruption, e.g. and new modes and taxonomies; 
the civil society saw the flourishing of anti-corruption and whistleblowing 
NGO’s and networks. The prototype of such networks is Prof. Eigen’s 
Transparency International, an initiative launched by German political sci-
entists, economists and lawyers, which grew into a powerful world-wide 
think-thank and a global political actor in the anti-corruption network. Other 
initiatives flourished, too: Centers for Corruption Research world-wide, the 
Global Trade-Union Anti-corruption Network (UNICORN), the Anti-Cor-
ruption Network for Transition Economies, the Anti-Corruption Network 
(ACN), the World Anti-Corruption Knowledge Center, the Center for Study 
of Transnational Corruption and Crime, The Global Forum on Fighting Cor-
ruption, the Internet Center for Corruption Research, UK’s Corner House 
Anti-Corruption Initiatives, the Open Society Institute (OSI) Corruption 
monitoring, the Freedom-House Nations in Transit Political Corruption Re-
view, etc.  
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 Yet political corruption disclosed in transitional countries was only the 
tip of the iceberg: corruption in these countries was a comprehensive “cul-
ture of corruption”, argued Miller, Groedeland and Koshechkina (2001), that 
permeates the whole fabric of the society. Obviously, the main process 
around which the interest of the political scientists studying corruption con-
centrates is the social and political reform that represents the very essence of 
the transition process. Privatization was achieved without a clear under-
standing of the dangers of corruption. Aggressive and hasty privatization 
opened space not only for the import of corruption, but also for the devel-
opment of autochthonous and original forms of corruption that pervaded the 
fragile societies of Eastern Europe. In many cases, reforms that were intro-
duced favored the quick spread of a predatory capitalism (Kregar, 1999), 
Darwinian in its crudity and rudeness, without any safeguards against abuse. 
Such reforms were generated by the new political and business elites who 
imitated what they perceived as the genuine capitalist values of a predatory 
capitalist model that existed only during the initial accumulation of capital, 
as Marx called it, and does not exists any more in the contemporary world, 
except in the most backwards regions of the Third World. These new elites 
tried to imitate and emulate the processes that could be found in the indus-
trial societies of the West during the early years of the 19th century, namely, 
the unscrupulous accumulation of wealth, accompanied by the impoverish-
ment of the population, as it was envisaged and predicted  in the first book of 
More’s Utopia three hundred years before it happened. 
 Was this only a misperception of the outer world by local, new, emergent 
elites, or was it also the product of incapability and ineptitude of the new 
political protagonists that emerged after the old nomenclature crumbled 
down? There is no clear answer to this question: reforms were made, mostly, 
in an uncoordinated manner, so that at the end, no one was personally com-
mitted to them and was driven to see them implemented effectively and kept 
up-to-date. The new class thought they would be the best students, by imi-
tating the birth of capitalism from its first stage: but the import of capitalism 
was not followed by the import of moral standards and ethical codes of busi-
ness conduct. The lack of ethical standards, professional deontology and so-
cial restraints exacerbated the cleavages and made the divisions inside the 
transitional countries deeper. The misperception, lack of knowledge and lack 
of moral standards brought about the legalization of improper behavior such 
as ambition, greed, aggressiveness, careerism. Such values as listed above 
became seen as acceptable and even desirable in the new capitalism that 
emerged from the ruins of communism. Those who opposed and fought 
communism, at the end of the day, adopted a primitive spoils system that 
meant support for all those allies who helped them destroy communism. This 
brought about clientelism, nepotism and political cronyism, in which a con-
flict of interest is not perceived as a threat to society, but as a vehicle of get-
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ting rich, as the main slogan of Lenin’s NEP – New Economic Policy in the 
early 1920s: “Get rich and don’t ask how!” (as interpreted in Ilf’s and Pet-
rov’s satirical novels about the epoch). The new political leaders accumu-
lated various powers and mixed them with their private interests: the legiti-
macy of fighting against communism automatically excused the sins of the 
fighters. The conflict of interests was not an issue in the first years of post-
communist transition. The new democracies instantly became more corrupt 
than the older ones. Political arbitrariness and partitocracy became the main 
features of such transitional societies.  
 On the other hand, reforms undertaken often missed the point: most of 
them did not have a specific and achievable focus and failed to deliver any 
real change to the wider public. Reforms of the political system tended to 
overlook those on the top and focused only on the lower echalons of society. 
These reforms, in many cases, relied too much on the law, which is an un-
certain instrument in trying to change the way people behave. Too much en-
forcement leads to repression, apparent abuse of power and the emergence, 
ultimately, of another corrupt regime. The rule of law was interpreted as the 
domination of the law over society, irrespectively of the nature of the law 
that can be unjust and unfair, thus turning against itself, discrediting the very 
essence of law.  
 Failures in the reform were also matched by unrealistic and unachievable 
expectations. Those who promised what they were not able to deliver lost 
the confidence of the wider society. The first years of reform gave a discour-
aging result throughout Eastern Europe. Only after 1995, after the EU set 
forth clear standards of behavior in business and politics and guidelines for 
reform in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe did the situation 
start gradually changing for the better (Monitoring the EU Accession Proc-
ess, 2002). The European Union intensified its efforts to convince the new 
business and political elite of Eastern Europe that they cannot import capi-
talism from the West without importing all policies and measures that im-
pede the degeneration of modern, post-industrial capitalism into the preda-
tory capitalism of the 19th century. The appeal was caught by the emergent 
civil society, that played a decisive role in guarding the guards, i.e., in rais-
ing awareness to misconducts and abuses of power that create a corrupt soci-
ety. The remedies were tailored to the needs of each individual society and 
they gave a good result in the Czech Republic, a relatively good result in 
Hungary, and a modest result in Poland, not to mention other transitional 
countries that lagged far behind (Trang, 1994). A clear failure in the reform 
was detected in Romania and Bulgaria, countries that did not succeed to join 
other transitional countries in the 2004 “Big Bang”, the fifth round of 
enlargement of the European Union, mostly due to the failure of fighting 
corruption (Monitoring the EU Accession Process, 2002). 
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 Political theory unveiled the areas of government activities most vulner-
able to political corruption during this difficult transitional phase. Of course, 
since political change is intrinsically bound to economic change, political 
corruption grew out of the first steps undertaken to change the whole socio-
economic system, i.e., from the privatization process. However, differences 
in approaches brought various outcomes: in the Czech Republic, where the 
model of a coupon-based privatization was applied, less space was left to 
political manipulation, political pressures and abuses of political power. In 
those countries where state owned companies were sold, more space was left 
for illicit transactions, as Petričević found in his comparative analysis of the 
privatization process in Croatia, and other transitional countries, except Po-
land (Petričević, 2000). In these countries the companies went either to for-
mer managers, who did the job during communism, or to new buyers who: 
either offered the highest price, or who where privileged by political power-
holders – not to mention those who where underprivileged, in fact, discrimi-
nated against for being close to the former communist nomenclature, as it 
happened in Croatia. The first type of takeover was characteristic of Russia 
and of the countries of the former Soviet Union, the second type occurred in 
Poland, the Baltic countries and Bulgaria (Kotkin and Sajo, 2002). 
 The extent of how much corruption was imported cannot be estimated. 
The liberalization of the markets in Eastern Europe stimulated companies 
from the West to penetrate these markets and, facing initial bureaucratic in-
effectiveness and resistance, tried to force the hand by adapting to the former 
communist “bakshish” mentality: to make things easier, to try to mollify the 
bureaucrat in charge, was the slogan. Thus Western companies (the majority 
of them, to be fair) deliberately used the business-corruption model they 
previously experienced and practiced in the Third World, a method that was 
tolerated as a form of doing business with the “corrupt part of the world”. 
However, when back in their countries of origin, these companies were 
strictly law-abiding, well aware that the use of corruption is tolerated only in 
dealing with Third World countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Some 
countries, like Japan, even introduced a tax-reducing law and bribes were in-
cluded in the costs of production. When the World Bank blew the whistle, 
about 10 % of the world GDP went to corruption purposes. Such enormous 
costs prompted the World Bank to raise the alarm and open an anti-corrup-
tion web-wide campaign, alongside with a massive campaign against busi-
ness corruption, as a first step to corruption in politics and in society in gen-
eral. This subsequently prompted the OECD to launch its Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, in November 1997. 
 Corruption took various forms and peculiar methods: transition officials 
– i.e. those who stayed in power initially after the changes started, or those 
who where installed during and after the political takeover – quickly adapted 
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to the new situation: officials started to take percentage on government con-
tracts, which were often paid into foreign bank accounts. These officials 
started to receive, what could be called, excessive hospitality from govern-
ment contractors and benefits in kind, such as scholarships for the education 
of their children at foreign schools, or trips abroad, with daily allowances 
that were set at almost extravagant levels.   
 Bureaucrats and political parties that emerged from the single-party sys-
tem used the prospect of power to levy large fees on international businesses 
in return for government contracts, which were usually disguised as dona-
tions to a designated party. Revenue officials used their official prerogatives 
and practiced extortion by threatening to surcharge importers unless bribes 
were paid. The import activity represented a vast area exposed to corruption: 
lower assessments were made on imported goods, and in numerous cases 
goods were brought into the country without payment of any duty at all. The 
officials after having been bribed, did their jobs promptly, eliminated delays 
and shortened the bureaucratic procedures. Providers of public services in-
sisted on payments for services they were supposed to provide as their regu-
lar job, after receiving the bribe they paid “special attention” to the business 
in question, or speeded up the process of issuing the requested permit or pa-
per, or simply prevented delays. Thus the offer that came from foreign in-
vestors and businesses matched the quickly developed capitalist mentality: if 
you want a service, pay for it. Business corruption matched street-level cor-
ruption and “bakshish” mentality, rooted deeply in the communist economy, 
where the bureaucratic machinery had to be greased from time to time if the 
subject – citizen only formally – wanted to survive. The corrupt practices of 
petty-bribery of communist times – when law enforcement officials extorted 
money for their own benefit by threatening to impose penalties, such as traf-
fic penalties unless bribes were paid (somewhat less than the penalty the of-
fense would attract if it went to court), and extra fees were charged to issue 
market stall permits and licenses, passports and documents– survived the 
transition and adapted well to the new social, economic and political circum-
stances, even prospering in new forms and practices.  
 As the adaptation of corruption went relatively smoothly, tolerated by the 
new power-holders who rushed to get rich themselves, eventually officials 
started to contract government business to themselves, either through 
friendly companies, concealed partners or even openly to themselves as con-
sultants, disregarding any possible allegation of outrageous conflicts of in-
terests. In fact, as the dating of most anti-corruption documents clearly 
shows, the conflicts of interests became an issue, political as well as moral, 
only in the second half of the nineties, bringing about a general awakening 
of conscience that provoked a massive international response,. From the area 
of business corruption quickly infiltrated the political sphere: party revenues 
and party income were not regulated until recently: in some cases, as in 
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Croatia, there is no law yet on party financing, and campaigns are permeated 
with private influence-buying contributions, unlimited in form and sub-
stance.  
 Thus the areas of governmental activities most vulnerable to corruption 
in transition countries include government permits, import duties, building 
licenses, land-registry inscriptions, public procurements, rezoning of lands 
and urban planning in general, revenue collection, kickbacks on government 
contracts, subcontracting and consulting and fraud of all kinds. These paved 
the way for political corruption, that manifested itself in corrupt party fi-
nancing and campaigning, arbitrary government appointments, cronyism, 
clientelism, nepotism, influence transactions, and blatant conflict of interests 
at the end of the line (Global Corruption Report, 2005).  
  
3. Political Corruption during the Croatian Transformation  
   and Privatization: a Brief Overview 
 The “original sin” of political corruption in Croatia is, beyond doubt, the 
process of privatization, i.e., the transformation of the so called, socially-
owned enterprises into private companies, owned by private individuals. 
This process started in 1991, immediately after Croatia gained its independ-
ence, by the adoption of the Law on Ownership Transformation of Socially-
Owned Property. The landslide electoral victory of the right-wing nationalist 
party, the Croatian Democratic Union, led by President Franjo Tuđman, 
paved the way for a complete take-over of all commanding positions in 
Croatian society. One of the first goals declared by Tuđman was the de-na-
tionalization of properties expropriated by the communist regime, as dis-
closed to the author by a close associate of Tuđman. This goal much debated 
in the press of the era. At the same time, Tuđman set forth to create a unique 
type of system, capitalism with a Croatian face. This system was supposed to 
rely on 200 Croatian families that would take over the economy and begin 
the initial accumulation of capital, thus creating a new entrepreneurial class 
that would lead the country towards a profound transformation. This trans-
formation could occur only by using political power and by eliminating all 
competitors – i.e. the old managerial stratum that in the previous twenty 
years led the economy, and by discouraging foreign investors that could ap-
pear and pretend to buy already well established economic ventures. In the 
first phase, that lasted until the end of nineties foreign investors were lim-
ited, to greenfield investments and new ventures.  
 Unlike other Eastern European countries, where managers of state-owned 
companies turned to become the new capitalist (Russia and Ukraine), the 
Croatian nationalist forces lead by Tuđman sought to remove professional 
business managers who were educated in the Yugoslav socialist/market 
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economy and to replace them with a completely new generation of entrepre-
neurs. As the majority of the well-trained, young Croatian entrepreneurs and 
managers who worked in the West or were educated in Western business 
schools did not come back to the country because of the war, the new people 
in power resorted to the oldest stratagem in “cadre-policy”: in recruitment of 
human resources they turned to confidence-men in their immediate sur-
roundings: their comrades-in-arms with whom they fought against the com-
munist nomenclature, their kin, and relatives, people from their villages and, 
finally, their political allies – clients and cronies. Thus the seizure of power 
and privatization brought a new group of people to the surface, that took the 
helm of the society and filled all commanding posts in politics, administra-
tion, and state owned enterprises. As a matter of fact, at the very beginning 
the HDZ counted on emigrants who would come back and plunge into the 
economic life of the country, bringing back their know-how learned in the 
West, but only a relatively few of them did so.  
 This new class led an all-out robbery of state-owned capital and trans-
formed it into privately-owned capital (Dragičević, 2005) in the hands of the 
most promising 200 Croatian families. At the end, the “notable families” 
turned to be only 117, and the new aristocracy developed a twisted interpre-
tation of meritocracy: the participation in the Homeland war and in the wars 
in former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina) was considered to be the 
measure of a person’s merits. Veterans were chosen, together with relatives 
and the ideological like-minded, to be the new propulsive social group that 
will drive Croatia into capitalism. 
 Croatian privatization started in 1991, by passing the first law on privati-
zation. The thesis that excessive regulation by law and law enforcement usu-
ally leads to non-transparency that favors political manipulation (stated in 
paragraph 2), is confirmed by evidence of the legal privatization procedure. 
From 1991 to 1996 the Law on Privatization was amended and changed 
twelve times, making it completely non-transparent and confused, as Pet-
ričević argues in the most comprehensive account of “the great Croatian pri-
vatization robbery”. This confusion enabled the Croatian Privatization Fund, 
the almighty state agency created in 1991, to interpret the law and its multi-
ple, contradictory changes arbitrarily. Petričević counted ten ways and 
modes of company takeovers under the explicit cooperation and control of 
the Croatian Privatization Fund. The Fund quickly became the most pres-
tigious (and powerful) institution in Croatia, more important than the Gov-
ernment itself.  
 As the first step was to establish state ownership over the banking sys-
tem, banks played a decisive role in enabling a corrupt privatization. Bank-
ers, under political influence and guidance, granted, so called, managerial 
loans to those suggested by the political leaders. And since banks accepted 
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mortgages and guarantees, on the very same companies that were bought, it 
is quite clear that a great number of companies were bought on the buyer’s 
word of honor. In cases were employees succeeded in buying shares of com-
panies in which they worked, the state intervened by annulling such transac-
tions, or by limiting the amount of shares offered to employees (Bejaković, 
2002). This is what happened in the case of the publishing house “Slobodna 
Dalmacija”, as documented by Polović (1995) and Petričević (2001).  
 I will present a case study of the company “Rukotvorine”, privatized in 
1994 to clarify the above. “Rukotvorine” was a prosperous producer of 
women’s leather accessories, woven handicrafts and embroideries. It em-
ployed less than 200 employees in two small factories and run 17 shops 
throughout Croatia. When the war broke out, the company lost the Yugoslav 
market, and the worsening of economic situation, the, so called, non-liquid-
ity of the economy (bills not paid by customers and consignees) forced the 
company to ask for loans to bridge the non-liquidity gaps and to pay the 
salaries, which were already reduced to a war minimum. Croatian banks 
conceded the loans, but when indebtedness reached 40% of the capital as-
sets, banks claimed a control packet of up to then non-existent shares. The 
Croatian Privatization Fund quickly decided to transform the assets of the 
company into shares, and generously ceded their packet of shares to the 
creditors, and a Croatian bank became the owner of the company.  
 In 1994 the bank decided to sell the company. Three offers were made by 
potentially buyers: the first came from the then current managerial team. 
They offered 5 million German marks, which they intended to borrow from 
a bank, with their private assets and mortgaged private properties as a guar-
antee for the loan. The second offer came from an Italian businessman of 
Croatian descent, who offered 8 million Marks in form of a loan granted by 
an Italian bank, which would have been fresh money poured into the Croa-
tian economy. The third offer came from two inexperienced businessmen, 
both members of the HDZ: one a former football player, the other a veteran. 
They offered 3,5 milion Marks, in form of a loan granted by the same bank 
that was selling the company. The company was sold to them. The condi-
tions of the loan were extremely good for the buyers: the interest rate fixed 
by the bank was only 3%, while the usual interest rate granted for bank loans 
of this type was from 8 to 11%. Additionally, a moratorium of three years 
was applied for the return of the loan. The two new businessmen took over 
the company, sold the office building in the first six months for 3 million in 
cash, laid off most of the workers, and rented the 17 shops the company 
owned. In practice, they sold the company and turned it to a rent-producing 
enterprise, which made them rich overnight. The only collateral damage 
were the circa 200 workers who lost their jobs (case study “Rukotvorine”, 
interview released to the author by the members of the managerial team in 
1994).  
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 Finally, the state-owned bank that sold such companies as “Rukotvorine” 
was itself sold to an Italian banking concern, and the banking secret was 
buried with the foreign owner that had no interest whatsoever to unearth 
scandals and misdoings of the former era. To be precise, the bank was sold 
under the condition of “rebus sic stantibus”, promising not to dig in the past. 
A circumstance that aggravated the situation is that the decision to sell the 
company was not a publicly announced competition. The information was 
passed on only in a restricted circle of the better informed: government offi-
cials, leading party members, loyal businessmen, and, generally speaking, a 
privileged audience. The transfer was completely non-transparent, and since 
the Law on Privatization was confused enough with its numerous amend-
ments, no legal recourse could be taken. This is only one of the 2650 com-
panies that underwent privatization during Tuđman’s time. In 908 of the 
cases legal proceeding were initiated against the Croatian Privatization Fund 
for abuses but with no practical result.  
 After the end of the stormy nineties, political change in Croatia brought 
an end to Tuđman’s authoritarian political regime. A real transformation of 
Croatian society and polity could start only then. One of the first moves of 
the new coalition government led by the social-democratic leader Račan was 
to start a revision of the privatization process that transferred an enormous 
wealth into private profiteering hands, instead giving them to those who 
would generate economic development and well-being in the country, as 
seen in the “Rukotvorine” case-study.  
 As result of a general public demand the Law on the Revision of the 
Transformation and Privatization was passed in 2001, at the very beginning 
of the new government’s mandate. The State Office for Revision (State Au-
dit Office), a book-keeping state office that used to control the expenditure 
of state finances, got the job to undertake a comprehensive investigation of 
the Croatian privatization misdoings. Račan’s government, which stepped 
down in November 2003, did not see the completion of the work. It was fi-
nally completed during the first year of the center-right government led by 
Ivo Sanader. It took more than three years to end the revision of the privati-
zation in Croatia. The results were made public in a 48-page report, a sum-
mary of the thorough inquiry. Out of the investigated 1006 cases of privati-
zation of state-owned companies, only in 75 companies did the committee 
not find any abuses and wrongdoings, which means that abuses and unlawful 
activities were detected in 931 companies. In the final conclusion, the State 
Office for Revision (State Audit Office) clearly and unconditionally states 
that the goals of the privatization were not achieved: the value of capital 
drastically diminished, the number of employees dramatically decreased, 
23% of the privatized companies underwent a bankruptcy procedure, and no 
development whatsoever was reported in 64% of the privatized companies. 
The only goal that was achieved was the transfer of propriety from state to 
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the privates hands, with the result of the creation of a new class, the nou-
veaux riches – this in Croatian colloquial jargon are often derisively called, , 
“the nouvaux niches”, which means the new nothing. 
 No need to say that nothing was done to start lawsuits against the 
perpetrators of the “great robbery of the century”. No political implications 
were drawn, owing to the fact that the new government is ideologically very 
close to those who ran “great robbery of the century”. The Croatian Democ-
ratic Union was reformed by its leader Sanader, who aspired to create a 
modern conservative, populist party leaving behind political authoritarianism 
and nationalism from the Tuđman era. In such historical circumstances, the 
history of privatization is a source of embarrassment for Sanader and his 
strong pro-European and pro-NATO politics. Although, the Report caused a 
heated debate in the Croatian parliament, no concrete operative conclusions 
and implications resulted. 
 Yet the privatization was closely followed by the World Bank and other 
international governmental and non-governmental bodies. The World Bank 
was very clear and straightforward: the slow and messy privatization process 
favored the “insiders”, the political elite, or those well connected with them. 
The employees and managers and their access in purchasing a company as 
laid down in the first original Law, was restricted even on paper (but espe-
cially in practice), but “insiders” were meant to be people inside the palace, 
the political power, those well connected to the political elite or the elite it-
self. The lack of transparency and the privileged treatment of the local po-
litical mafia led to a growing number of reports of corruption and raised the 
concern of potential investors (World Bank, 2000). This led to a general 
conclusion about Croatia’s economic vulnerability by the World Bank one 
year later.  
 Yet dramatic conclusions were not drawn by the scientific community: 
even Bejaković in his well argumented study (2002) draws the conclusion 
that such process had a negative result, namely the strengthening of the in-
formal economy, the gray-zone of business, and raising the barriers to busi-
ness, and hindering economic development and growth. Bejaković reacts as 
an economist, while Petričević is mostly interested in the narrative of the 
scandals surrounding Croatian privatization. He excellently exposes it with 
an unusual meticulousness. Another critic of Croatian privatization, Deren-
činović (2001), reduces corruption to the problem of the law and law en-
forcement. The only one who seems to understand the final implications of 
such corruptive transformation and privatization in Croatia seems to be Kre-
gar, his analysis transcends the legal profession to whom he belongs and 
reaches the subtleness of a sociological analysis.  
 The conclusion that political scientists – whether or not they share the 
orthodox Marxist interpretation that the economic base of the society deter-
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mines its political, social and legal infrastructure – can easily draw is that no 
long lasting state can build its foundation on the infirm ground of such mas-
sive corruption, as occurred in Croatia during the last decade. A castle built 
on sand, whatever the good material it is constructed of and well projected 
by the architects, is, sooner or later, inevitably going to fall down, to use 
Machiavelli’s analogy.  
 How was the importance of this corruption at the origin of the Croatian 
modern state and society perceived? In the post-Tuđman era Croatian gov-
ernments, Račan’s as well as Sanader’s, adopted, declaratively, a clear 
commitment to fight corruption. The result materialized in the Anti-Corrup-
tion Action Program adopted by Račan’s government in 2002, and the Na-
tional Program for Countering Corruption 2006-2008 adopted by Sanader’s 
government in 2006. However, both programs are lacking in substance and 
in form. Račan’s Anti-Corruption Action Program has never been applied 
fully and thoroughly: a law on the conflict of interests was passed, as envis-
aged by the Action Program, as well as a law establishing the Office for 
Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime. Only in 2006, four years after the 
passing of the law, did the Croatian Parliament establish a parliamentary 
commission dealing with the application of this law, controlling and investi-
gating possible conflicts of interests.  
 The Office for Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime (as part of the 
State Attorney’s Office) has worked well since its inception in 2001, but on 
the basis of legal reductionist interpretations, where corruption is treated as a 
criminal felony or misdemeanor, as classical embezzlement and graft, this 
meaning petty corruption. For this reason the Croatian Criminal law was 
amended by including several provisions on graft, embezzlement of money, 
money laundering, illegal fund transfers, trafficking, etc. Except for this, the 
Anti-Corruption Program remained ineffective, a “dead letter on paper”, as 
the Croatian saying goes. 
 Sanader’s government took two years and a half to pass its National 
Anti-Corruption Program, and it did only after strong pressure from the 
European Union, that dealt with the issue of corruption in various reports 
submitted by the European Commission to the Council, as part of Croatia’s 
request for accession to the EU. Only EU conditionality prompted Sanader’s 
government to adopt such a plan after long delays. However, neither Račan’s 
nor Sanader’s plan refer to the causes of corruption in Croatia. As political 
scientists using the research methods appropriate to political science (i.e. de-
scription, classification, comparative analysis et al.), we cannot but empha-
size that in politics one should look for the causes of a political phenomenon, 
and try to get as far as one can in finding the first determinant cause. The 
corruption of privatization is the first cause of political corruption in Croatia. 
All other forms of political corruption in Croatia are a derivation of corrupt 
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privatization: the corruption of the judiciary, the corruption of the public 
administration, the conflict of interests, party corruption, political clientelism 
and non-transparency of party funding, secretiveness and non-transparency 
in the Government, excessive bureaucratic regulations and exaggerated reg-
istration requirements, arbitrary government appointments, non-prosecution 
of corrupt government officials, lack of protection for whistle-blowers and 
those who expose political corruption in the public. Of course, “street-level” 
or petty-corruption existed before, alongside with the corruption of the 
whole system: such forms of corruption survived the changes, but the stress 
here is on political corruption, i.e. the corruption of the political system. 
 The Račan government’s Anti-Corruption Plan did not even mention 
privatization and corruption during its implementation. The Sanader Gov-
ernment’s National Program for Suppressing (curbing) Corruption 2001-
2008 mentions privatization in paragraph 5.2., but formulates the problem in 
the framework of a necessity to analyze the status of privatization of the 
state portfolio and the plan for the continuation of privatization. It has to be 
stated clearly, says the National program, what should not be, and what 
could be done up to what level of shares, and what is the deadline for the 
continuation of the privatization process, and moreover, to ensure the effi-
cient and accelerated implementation of the plan and program of privatiza-
tion. As part of this task, the Plan stresses the need to analyze the role of the 
state in the “operative guidance of commercial societies owned by the state”, 
and to propose measures and ways, as well as modes of the state’s gradual 
withdrawal and the transfer of the operative guidance to the management 
and boards of the commercial societies. The third task, as it is formulated 
under the heading “Privatization”, is that the State, as an owner of public 
companies, should make sure, that it will be represented in the control 
boards in an adequate number, for the sake of the defending the public inter-
est. As privatization continues, the number of state representatives will de-
crease. 
 A corrupt system that is built on corrupt privatization can only be re-
paired, but cannot be reformed drastically: a corruption-free society cannot 
be laid on corrupted foundations. We do not deal with corruption in the sys-
tem: here we deal with the corruption of the system, and therefore it is diffi-
cult to repair it if one does not detect the primary cause that created such a 
corrupt system in the first place. 
 Political science and political analysis has to approach the problem of po-
litical corruption in Croatia properly. Political science, however, also has to 
be defined, and this definition has to start from common premises, but has to 
be refined with the knowledge of the concrete society and its politics. Here 
Max Weber’s statement about the definition of the problem is especially ap-
propriate. The problem cannot be defined in advance, but only at the end of 
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the exposition of all relevant elements of the political phenomenon we ob-
serve and discuss. The role of political science is not only to define the 
problem, compare it, analyze its causes and categorize it within our system 
of values and discover its hidden aspects in order to disclose the Machiavel-
lian “effectual truth of the things”. The role of political science is also to try 
to give prescriptions, predictions and to trace the contours for the improve-
ment of the human polity. This is what political science is about, not merely 
the finding of who gets what, when and how. In order to pursue its true goal, 
political science has to disclose the causes of political processes as well as 
the motives for the behavior of the actors in a political system.  
 Therefore, political corruption in Croatia is a valid challenge for building 
and developing political science in this field. The first stage should, un-
doubtedly, be to include political corruption in the political science curricula. 
The second phase should be to establish political corruption as a permanent 
research topic within the Croatian national research program. The third 
phase is one proposed by Amy Goodman: education about political corrup-
tion, which should be part of the citizens’ education. This way political cor-
ruption will not be restricted only to political pathology, but combating po-
litical corruption will be experienced as part of a daily struggle to achieve 
democracy and a better world to live in.  
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